Senate Passes the Protect College Sports Act

The Protect College Sports Act (PCSA) is heading to the House of Representatives after
passing the Senate in a 77–22 vote on Monday, September 28.[1] The bill would establish a federal framework for collegiate athletics, including a limited antitrust exemption protecting the National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) and its member institutions when enforcing rules governing athlete compensation. While the PCSA offers several positive reforms,[2] the proposed antitrust exemption raises significant concerns about athletes’ future earning potential and bargaining power. [3]

Athlete Compensation Under the PCSA
When the House settlement was approved, it marked a major shift away from the NCAA’s traditional model of amateurism by allowing athletes to receive direct compensation from their institutions while continuing to earn compensation through third-party NIL deals.[4] The PCSA builds upon that structure and would allow institutions to exceed the House created revenue-sharing cap, which is approximately $21.6 million for 2026-27. Schools would now be permitted to spend an additional $22.5 million per year to retain a student-athlete, or group of student-athletes, who have spent at least one full competitive season at the institution.[5] The Act would further allow institutions to exceed the cap by up to $5 million per year for compensation provided to student-athletes participating in non-revenue-generating  sports, including women’s and Olympic sports (bringing a school’s total annual “salary cap” to nearly $50 million).[6]

Although these provisions expand the amount of money institutions can provide directly to athletes, the PCSA also grants the NCAA and its member institutions federal antitrust protection for the enforcement of those compensation limits.[7] The reason this is problematic is that antitrust litigation has been one of the principal tools athletes have used to challenge NCAA compensation restraints.[8] With federal legislation shielding the NCAA and its member institutions from antitrust liability, athletes would lose a previously successful avenue for challenging restrictions on student-athlete compensation.

“Collective” Bargaining
In professional sports, leagues and players’ unions negotiate compensation restraints (such as salary caps) through collective bargaining. Certain restraints arising through that collective bargaining agreement are then protected from antitrust challenges under the nonstatutory labor exemption. Here, the PCSA is essentially allowing the NCAA and its member institutions to receive the benefits of a collectively bargained system without first having to negotiate those restrictions with the athletes subject to them. Meghann Burke, executive director of the National Women’s Soccer League Players Association, puts this concern squarely in the face of supporters:

“The PCSA would further insulate these institutions from accountability while denying athletes one of the most fundamental rights workers have: the right to organize and collectively bargain.”[9]

The concern, then, is not that the PCSA would immediately reduce the amount athletes can earn. It is a question of who ultimately controls the cap on those payments, and whether athletes retain a meaningful legal mechanism to challenge them. That is especially significant in college football, where more than ten programs are reportedly spending at least $40 million on their 2026-27 rosters alone.[10] Those figures suggest substantial market demand for elite football talent, underscoring the significance of placing federally protected limits on what athletes may receive.

https://www.nytimes.com/athletic/7590329/2026/09/17/college-football-revenue-sharing-nil-cap-budgets/

The PCSA’s Next Hurdle
Despite its overwhelming passage in the Senate, the PCSA still faces a narrow legislative window. The House of Representatives is not expected to consider the bill until after the midterm elections on November 3, meaning any vote would likely occur during the “lame-duck” session before the next Congress takes office in January.

 

[1] https://www.congress.gov/bill/119th-congress/senate-bill/4668.

[2] https://ublawsportsforum.com/2026/09/22/the-protect-college-athletes-act/.

[3] https://aflcio.org/about/advocacy/legislative-alerts/letter-opposing-legislation-empowers-ncaa-unilaterally-set-rules.

[4] In re Coll. Athlete NIL Litig., 803 F. Supp. 3d 959 (N.D. Cal. 2025).

[5] See § 114 of the PCSA: https://www.commerce.senate.gov/wp-content/uploads/2026/09/PCSA-Text-091726.pdf.

[6] Id.

[7] See §§ 114, 115, and 118 of the PCSA: https://www.commerce.senate.gov/wp-content/uploads/2026/09/PCSA-Text-091726.pdf.

[8] See generally O’Bannon v. NCAA, 802 F.3d 1049, 1064–76 (9th Cir. 2015); NCAA v. Alston, 594 U.S. 69, 88–107 (2021); In re Coll. Athlete NIL Litig., 803 F. Supp. 3d 959 (N.D. Cal. 2025).

[9] https://www.espn.com/college-football/story/_/id/50001346/protect-college-sports-act-truths-myths-congress.

[10] https://www.nytimes.com/athletic/interactive/college-football-nil-spending-budgets/.

J.D. Candidate at  | jcsteven@buffalo.edu |  + posts

J.D. Candidate at the University at Buffalo School of Law, Class of 2027.
President, Buffalo Sports and Entertainment Law Society.
Executive Editor, Buffalo Law Review.
Former NCAA Athlete.

Leave a Reply

Powered by WordPress.com.

Up ↑

Discover more from

Subscribe now to keep reading and get access to the full archive.

Continue reading